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The ability of virtual reality (VR) to recreate controlled, immersive, and interactive
environments that provide intensive and customized exercises has motivated its
therapeutic use after stroke. Interaction and bodily presence in VR-based interventions is
usually mediated through virtual selves, which synchronously represent body movements
or responses to events on external input devices. Embodied self-representations in the
virtual world not only provide an anchor for visuomotor tasks, but their morphologies can
have behavioral implications. While research has focused on the underlying subjective
mechanisms of exposure to VR on healthy individuals, the transference of these findings
to individuals with stroke is not evident and remains unexplored, which could affect the
experience and, ultimately, the clinical effectiveness of neurorehabilitation interventions.
This study determined and compared the sense of embodiment and presence elicited
by a virtual environment under different perspectives and levels of immersion in healthy
subjects and individuals with stroke. Forty-six healthy subjects and 32 individuals with
stroke embodied a gender-matched neutral avatar in a virtual environment that was
displayed in a first-person perspective with a head-mounted display and in a third-person
perspective with a screen, and the participants were asked to interact in a virtual
task for 10min under each condition in counterbalanced order, and to complete two
questionnaires about the sense of embodiment and presence experienced during the
interaction. The sense of body-ownership, self-location, and presence were more vividly
experienced in a first-person than in a third-person perspective by both healthy subjects
(p < 0.001, η2p = 0.212; p = 0.005, η
2
p = 0.101; p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.401, respectively)
and individuals with stroke (p = 0.019, η2p = 0.070; p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.135; p = 0.014,
η
2
p = 0.077, respectively). In contrast, no agency perspective-related differences were
found in any group. All measures were consistently higher for healthy controls than
for individuals with stroke, but differences between groups only reached statistical
significance in presence under the first-person condition (p < 0.010, η2p = 0.084). In
spite of these differences, the participants experienced a vivid sense of embodiment and
presence in almost all conditions. These results provide first evidence that, although less
intensively, embodiment and presence are similarly experienced by individuals who have
suffered a stroke and by healthy individuals, which could support the vividness of their
experience and, consequently, the effectiveness of VR-based interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
Classical definitions of embodiment have resorted to the concepts
of corporeal awareness (1), bodily self-consciousness (2), and the
sense of one’s own body (3). Embodiment, however, is a complex
multi-component phenomenon that could be better described as
the representation of an element within the body schema (4), the
mental representation of body parts and reachable space, which
effectively extends or displaces the normal area of influence
of the body parts by real or artificial body parts, habitually
used tools, or prostheses (5). Although its neural mechanisms
are unclear, it is hypothesized that embodiment operates both
via automatic bottom-up and potentially conscious top-down
processes to permit the establishment of sensorimotor maps of
one’s body parts with respect to one’s body (5). Previous research
has identified different constitutive components of embodiment,
including body-ownership, self-location, and agency (5). An
understanding of their dissociation is, however, uncertain (6).
Body-ownership can be defined as the sense that the body that
one inhabits is one’s own. Self-location alludes to the sense of
being in the place where one’s body is. Agency refers to the sense
that one can move and control one’s own body.
Experiments on multisensory and/or sensorimotor
stimulation have allowed remarkable modulations of the
perceived body to be performed, with respect to its natural
configuration, which are known as body illusions (7). Body
illusions have enabled the investigation of the embodiment
subcomponents separately, with a particular emphasis on body-
ownership. Because body-ownership should be continuous and
omnipresent (8), synchronous visuotactile stimulation has been
proven to be sufficient to induce this sense not only over rubber
hands (9) or feet (10), but also over mannequins (11), in the
absence of agency. In contrast, only experiments involving self-
triggered actions, fired by efferent signals, have elicited agency
(12). Virtual reality (VR) is a paradigmatic case of the former,
as it provides multisensory stimulation while allowing real-time
user interaction (13). Previous experimentation employing VR
has successfully induced embodiment over virtual body parts
(14, 15) and entire virtual bodies (16). Importantly, embodying
virtual selves may not only affect the body schema, but could also
modulate perception (17) and behavior, according to the physical
characteristics of the incarnated avatar (18, 19).
Experience in VR is likewise strongly modulated by the sense
of presence, which is the sense of being in the virtual environment
(VE) (20) or, in other words, the sense of existing inside it
(21). Similarly to embodiment, presence is a multi-component
construct (22). Both user characteristics (either demographical,
psychological, or clinical) and media characteristics (content or
form, also known as immersion) contribute to the experience
(22). However, the interaction between presence and immersion,
the extent to which VR is capable of delivering an illusion of
reality to the human senses (13), is not obvious. Nevertheless,
a greater sense of presence is expected for higher levels of
immersion, provided that other characteristics of the experience
remain unchanged (22).
Although it seems reasonable that being in a specific
environment can impact the sense of having, moving, and
being in a body, and vice versa, research has focused on each
construct individually and, consequently, interactions between
embodiment and presence remain underexplored. A preliminary
uncontrolled study using consumer HMDs attempted to find
interactions between embodiment and presence by modulating
the existence of a static avatar in the VE, which was supposed to
be embodied by the participants (23). The experiment did not
find connections between the investigated constructs because,
among other possible reasons, it failed to elicit embodiment over
the avatar, which was not able to reproduce the participants’
movements. Analogously, a study with an augmented reality-
based mirror found no connections between embodiment and
presence because, in this case, it failed to promote presence in the
VE (24). Another experiment by the same group, however, was
successful at promoting high levels of embodiment and presence
in a mixed reality environment, but interactions between
constructs were not discussed (25). The only true attempt
made to disentangle this interrelation suggested that perspective
influences body-ownership and self-location over a virtual avatar,
but not presence nor agency (26), which contradicts previous
reports on presence (27–29).
The ability of VR to recreate controlled, immersive, and
interactive environments that engage participants in intensive
and customized exercises, has motivated its use in different
neurological populations, especially stroke. VR-based exercises
provide goal-directed tasks that are accomplished in the virtual
world by the actions of virtual selves, which are controlled by
the participants (30). Users usually experience the virtual world
either from a first-person (egocentric) perspective, using a head-
mounted display (HMD), or from a third-person (allocentric)
perspective, displayed on a screen. In motor interventions,
interaction is usually facilitated by body movements, which are
transferred to a virtual avatar that mimics the actions in the
virtual world (31–33). Although an increasing number of studies
show the potential of VR-based interventions on motor function
after stroke (34, 35), with a special emphasis on balance (36) and
upper limb (37), little is known about how VR experiences are
mediated in this population. On the contrary, all our insights
into embodiment and presence have been provided by studies
involving healthy subjects, predominantly young adults (38–41).
The scant existing literature suggests that the ability to sense
presence after stroke may be preserved (42), but there have been
no previous reports on the ability to embody virtual selves. A few
reports on body illusions in the real world, involving individuals
with stroke, have shown contradictory results (43, 44).
While a significant body of research has focused on the
underlying subjective mechanisms of exposure to VR on healthy
individuals, the transference of these findings to individuals with
stroke is not evident and remains unexplored. The importance
of investigating such mechanisms in individuals after stroke is
that they may influence the experience and performance in the
VE, which, ultimately, could affect the clinical effectiveness of
neurorehabilitation interventions. Thus, the hypotheses of this
study were: first, that healthy subjects can experience a vivid
sense of embodiment and presence after interaction with a virtual
task that would vary with the level of immersion and spatial
representation, in accordance with the findings of previous
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studies; and second, that the elicited experience and variation
would be analogously reproduced in a sample of individuals with
stroke. Hence, the objectives of this study were to determine and
compare perceived embodiment and presence, under different
conditions of immersion and spatial representation, in samples
of healthy subjects and individuals with stroke.
METHODS
Participants
A convenience and representative sample of healthy subjects
and individuals with stroke was recruited from the staff and
outpatient unit of the neurorehabilitation service of Vithas
Hospital Valencia al Mar (València, Spain).
Healthy subjects, with no know musculoskeletal or
psychological impairment, and matched ages and genders
to those of the stroke group, were recruited. Individuals with
stroke were included in the study if they had the ability to
understand and interact with a VR-based task. Specifically, the
exclusion criteria applied to the stroke group included: first,
severe cognitive impairment, as defined by scores below 23 in
the Mini-Mental State Examination (45); second, an inability to
follow instructions, as defined by scores below 45 in the receptive
language index of the Mississippi Aphasia Screening Test (46);
third, a risk of falling, as defined by scores below 45 in the Berg
Balance Scale (47); fourth, visual or hearing impairment that did
not allow for interaction; and finally, unilateral spatial neglect.
Forty-six healthy subjects (25 men and 21 women), with a
mean age of 50.8 ± 10.9 years, agreed to participate in the
study (Table 1). Thirty-two individuals with stroke (18 men and
14 women), with a mean age of 48.8 ± 11.8 years, satisfied
the participation criteria and agreed to participate in the study
(Table 1). These participants presented either ischemic (n = 25)
or haemorrhagic stroke (n = 7), with a mean time since onset of
9.2 ± 3.0 months. Both groups were comparable in terms of age
and gender.
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the
Institutional Review Board of Vithas Hospital Valencia al
Mar (TU763198CIS0/1). All participants provided written
informed consent before taking part in the study.
Instrumentation
An adaptation of an interactive VR-based stepping task, which
had been previously administered to individuals with stroke
for therapeutic purposes (32, 48), was used as a control
task. The VE consisted of an infinite checkered floor, with a
central gray circle with a diameter of 50 cm, and a gender-
matched mesomorph avatar, which synchronously mimicked
the participants’ movements (Figure 1). Playdough-colored
items (cubes, spheres, and cones), with a bounding box of
20×20×20 cm, appeared on the floor in front of the central circle.
The objective of the task was to step on the items before they
disappeared with the closest avatar foot, while keeping the other
foot inside the central circle. In between stepping on the items,
the foot used had to be moved back into the circle (32, 48).
Specific animations and sound effects indicated when an item
appeared, disappeared, and was squashed. Extrinsic feedback was








Sex (n, %) NS
(p = 0.868)
Male 25 (54.3%) 18 (56.2%)
Female 21 (45.7%) 14 (43.8%)
Age (years) 50.8 ± 10.9 48.8 ± 11.8 NS
(p = 0.443)
Etiology (n, %) –
Ischemic stroke – 25 (78.1%)
Hemorrhagic stroke – 7 (21.9%)
Lesion side (n, %) –
Left – 22 (68.7%)
Right – 10 (31.3%)
Time since injury
(months)
– 9.2 ± 3.0 –
Mini-mental state
examination [0–30]
– 26.4 ± 2.0 –
Mississippi aphasia
screening test [0–50]
– 47.5 ± 1.6 –
Berg balance scale
[0–56]
– 51.0 ± 2.9 –
Sex, etiology, and lesion side are expressed as a percentage of the total number of
participants. Age, time since injury, and scores in the clinical measures are expressed
in terms of mean and standard deviation. NS, non-significant.
provided during the task, with information on the number of
items successfully stepped on and the remaining time (Figure 1).
At the end of the task, the percentage of items stepped on
was shown.
To reproduce two of the most widely used VR configurations,
the VE was represented either from the avatar’s egocentric point
of view (first-person perspective), and displayed with a HMD, the
Oculus Rift CV1 (Oculus VR, Irvine, CA), or from an allocentric
point of view (third-person perspective), displayed on a 60
′′
LED
Screen (LG, Seoul, South Korea), which was hung on a wall, with
its center at∼175 cm from the floor (Figure 1). The center of the
VE was defined as being at a distance of 2m in front of the screen,
which was marked on the floor. The HMD had a resolution of
2,160× 1,200, a refresh rate of 90Hz, and horizontal and vertical
fields of view of 94◦ and 93◦, respectively (49). The screen had
a resolution of 1,920 × 1,080, a refresh rate of 60Hz, and had
approximate effective horizontal and vertical fields of view to
the participants of 37◦ and 11◦, respectively. Auditory feedback
was provided by the integrated headphones in the HMD or the
integrated speakers of the TV screen, as appropriate. Interaction
was facilitated by a Kinect forWindows v2 (Microsoft, Redmond,
WA), which was fixed under the TV at a height of 80 cm from the
floor to ensure full body-tracking (50, 51). This device provided
the positions of the main joints of the participants at 30Hz. In
the third-person perspective, all joints were used to animate the
avatar. By way of contrast, in the first-person perspective, head
rotation and acceleration were provided by the HMD (Figure 1).
A high-end computer, including an 8-core Intel R© CoreTM i7-
4790 @3.60 GHz, 8 GB of RAM, and a NVIDIA R© Geforce R© GTX
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FIGURE 1 | Interaction with the virtual task and virtual environment in first and
third-person condition. The figure shows: (A) a participant interacting with the
virtual task in first-person perspective (up), and the virtual environment
displayed by the HMD (down), and (B) the same participant interacting with
the virtual task in third-person perspective (up), and the virtual environment
displayed by the screen (B). In both conditions, the participant is squashing a
pink playdough item located on the ground with his left foot.
Titan Xp with 12 GB of GDDR5, was used to run the VE during
the experiment.
Procedure
Two experimenters were in charge of conducting the sessions
and ensuring the safety and comfort of the participants. The
participants, who were blind to the purpose of the experiment,
were briefly introduced to the instrumentation, procedure, and
task. They were then situated on the mark on the floor, looking
toward the Kinect for Windows v2, and then the experiment
started. All participants interacted with the VE for 10min,
in counterbalanced order, under both conditions: first-person
perspective with the HMD and third-person perspective with
the TV screen. After each condition, the participants were asked
to evaluate their perceived sense of embodiment and presence,
using two dedicated questionnaires: an adapted version of the
Embodiment of Rubber Hand Questionnaire (38) and the Slater-
Usoh-SteedQuestionnaire (52), respectively. The adapted version
of the Embodiment of Rubber HandQuestionnaire contained the
same 10 items as the original version but references to a rubber
hand were replaced by equivalent references to the virtual avatar.
Consequently, this questionnaire assessed the extent to which the
participant: can control the avatar with their movements; feels
located in the same place as the avatar; and feels the body of the
avatar belonged to them. The Slater-Usoh-Steed Questionnaire is
a three-item Likert-scale questionnaire that evaluates: the sense
of being in a VE; the extent to which a VE feels real; and the
extent to which a VE is thought of as a place visited. The scores
for both questionnaires ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). A speech therapist was in charge of explaining
the questions of the questionnaires to the participants with stroke
and solving any possible doubt about their meaning.
Data Analysis
Subcomponents of embodiment were defined, according to the
original description on the questionnaire, as the average score
of the first five statements (body-ownership), of the sixth to
eighth statements (localization), and of the last two statements
(agency) (38). Average scores >4 were considered as denoting a
meaningful reflection of the vividness of the experience (38, 43).
Mixed ANOVAs were performed to determine the differences
between the conditions for the individual groups (healthy and
stroke) as between-subject, and perspective as within-subject,
factors. The investigators performing the data analysis were
blinded. The analyses were computed using SPSS for Windows R©
v22 (IBM R©, Armonk, NY, USA).
RESULTS
Scores for the experienced embodiment and presence, and the
statistical differences between them, are provided in Figures 2,
3, respectively.
Statistically significant differences were identified between the
healthy subjects under the first- and third-person conditions for
body-ownership (5.41 ± 0.88 vs. 4.36 ± 1.39; F(1,76) = 20.473,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.212), self-location (5.43± 0.84 vs. 4.74± 1.47;
F(1,76) = 8.553, p = 0.005, η
2
p = 0.101), and presence (5.49 ±
0.81 vs. 4.03 ± 1.24; F(1,76) = 50.973, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.401).
Higher values of these variables were consistently detected for the
first-person perspective. Nonetheless, both conditions seemed to
successfully induce body-ownership and self-location over the
virtual avatar, and presence in the VE, based on the fact that
all values exceeded the meaningful threshold. The scores for
the sense of presence under the third-person condition were,
however, borderline. No differences between conditions were
detected for agency (5.98 ± 0.75 vs. 6.04 ± 0.82), which showed
the highest values of all the subconstructs of embodiment.
Similar to the healthy participants, statistically significant
differences were found between the first- and third-person
conditions in the stroke group for body-ownership (4.61 ±
2.02 vs. 3.95 ± 1.92; F(1,76) = 5.753, p = 0.019, η
2
p = 0.070),
self-location (5.10 ± 1.53 vs. 4.13 ± 2.15; F(1,76) = 11.910,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.135), and presence (4.45 ± 1.80 vs. 3.83
± 1.61; F(1,76) = 6.357, p = 0.014, η
2
p = 0.077). While these
variables were rated as having been vividly experienced in
the first-person condition, the third-person condition barely
induced self-location over the virtual avatar, and the scores for
body-ownership and presence did not (although they almost
did) reach the meaningful threshold. As in the healthy group,
agency did not show differences between conditions (5.59 ±
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FIGURE 2 | Reports on embodiment sub-constructs in both conditions. The figure shows box and whisker plots of the sense of (A) body-ownership, (B) self-location,
and (C) agency experienced by healthy subjects and individuals with stroke in both conditions. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
FIGURE 3 | Reports on sense of presence in both conditions. The figure
shows a box and whisker plot of the sense of presence experienced by
healthy subjects and individuals with stroke in both conditions. *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01.
1.41 vs. 5.25 ± 1.58), and obtained the highest scores of all the
embodiment subconstructs.
A comparison between the groups evidenced statistically
significant differences in presence (5.49 ± 0.81 vs. 4.45 ± 1.80;
F(1,76) = 6.952, p = 0.010, η
2
p = 0.084) in the first-person
condition. The scores for embodiment and presence in the
healthy group were consistently higher than those in the stroke
group for all measures and under both conditions.
DISCUSSION
This study investigated and compared the sense of embodiment
and presence experienced by a sample of healthy subjects
and individuals with stroke during exposure to an interactive
VR task from different perspectives and under different levels
of immersion. The results evidenced that the first-person
perspective using HMD elicited a greater sense of body-
ownership and self-location over a virtual avatar and a greater
sense of presence in both populations. Agency, however,
remained almost invariable between conditions. The participants
with stroke consistently reported less vivid experiences than
the healthy participants, while the differences between the
groups were only statistically significant for body-ownership and
presence under the first-person condition.
The greater sense of body-ownership and self-location under
the first-person condition, and the comparable sense of agency
under both conditions, reported by the healthy subjects are in line
with previous findings (26, 53–55) and also evidence the distinct
natures of the different illusions. The contradictory findings of
a previous study, which reported similar vividness of body-
ownership and agency, regardless of the perspective, might be
explained by a lack of sensitivity in the measurement tools used,
as only one question was used to assess each illusion (56). Similar
to the effect of perspective on body-ownership and self-location,
the greater levels of presence reported by the healthy subjects
during the high-immersion condition is supported by previous
research (27–29). Interestingly, the only previous experiment that
simultaneously investigated embodiment and presence varying
the point of view in the VE reported an invariable sense
of presence between perspectives for an invariable degree of
immersion (26). This could indicate that the differences in
presence detected under each condition in our study might
be better explained by the difference in immersion rather
than perspective. Unfortunately, as both concepts were jointly
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modified for each condition in our study, it is not possible
to identify the determining factor for presence. Despite the
differences in the sensed embodiment and presence between
conditions, their scores may indicate that healthy subjects are
able to successfully incarnate virtual avatars and be present
in a virtual world, independent of the perspective and the
mediating technology.
Although they did not reach statistical significance, the lower
scores for body-ownership and self-location in individuals with
stroke in the first-person perspective might suggest a difficulty
in these participants to experience the virtual body as their
own and being located in it. Although there have been no
previous studies that have investigated embodiment in VEs after
stroke, experiments involving body illusions in the real world
have reported contradictory results that have shown either an
increased (43, 57) or decreased (44) predisposition to body-
ownership. In our study, post-stroke cognitive disorders, such as
a diminished capacity for abstract thinking, which is commonly
identified after stroke (58), might have challenged the incarnation
of the virtual avatars that, while mimicking the participants’
movements, still remained neutral, non-real versions of the
participants. In addition, limitations in the bodymotion-tracking
provided by the Kinect v2 (50) and of the mobility of the
avatars may have led to some pathological motor patterns in the
individuals with stroke to not be exactly reproduced by their
virtual selves, which may have reduced their identification of
the avatar as their own body and being located in the virtual
avatar. This could explain why participants with stroke reported
control over the avatar movements, but did not report ownership
or self-location. It is important, however, to highlight that the
vividness of the embodiment subcomponents was supported
by the scores for the different illusions, which exceeded the
meaningful threshold under both conditions, but for body-
ownership, which were slightly lower than that under the third-
person condition. The statistical differences in the sense of
presence between the groups were analogous to differences for
body-ownership and self-location, with the stroke group showing
lower scores. Likewise for these illusions, the cognitive condition
of the individuals with stroke might have complicated their
interpretations of the VE as real and, consequently, decreased
their sense of existing in it; however, also similarly to body-
ownership and self-location, scores for this sense support the
vividness of the experience.
In summary, the highest scores for sensed body-ownership,
self-location, and presence, were provided by the healthy
subjects, regardless of condition, and for the first-person
perspective with a HMD, regardless of the group. The sense
of agency, in contrast, received invariably high scores under
all conditions and for both groups. The analogous scores for
individuals with stroke and the healthy control group support
that the sense of embodiment and presence were similarly
experienced in both populations. This suggests that the basic
mechanisms that modulate these phenomena could be preserved
after a stroke, and may support the effectiveness of VR
interventions in this population.
CONCLUSIONS
A sense of embodiment and presence were effectively
experienced in both healthy subjects and individuals post-
stroke, although less intensively in the latter. The feelings were
similarly modulated by perspective and level of immersion.
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